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Abstract
This paper uses data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education
to examine the receipt of transfers by immigrants in conqiarison to the
native bom. The average level of transfers is found to be considerably
higher among families headed by male immigrants. However, this is
almost entirely due to the higher average age of family members among
the immigrant group—a reflection of the large inflows of immigrants
into the U.S. during the pre-World War I period. Holding other factors
(including age) constant, immigrant families are found to be considerably
less likely to rely on welfare than native families, while their receipts
from social insurance programs are found to be only slightly higher.

I. Introduction
The recent large inflows of refugees from Southeast Asia, Cuba,
and Haiti, and of illegal immigrants from Mexico, Latin America, and
elsewhere have focused public attention on the consequences of these
population movements for the United States economy. When considering
the advisability of admitting immigrants to the U.S., their use of the
transfer system is necessarily a major consideration. While this issue
is one that excites much public interest, relatively little previous
work has been done on the topic.
Some of this concern over the economic impact of immigrants may
stem from beliefs that recent arrivals differ in important respects
from earlier immigrants. However, given the time dependent nature of
the "Americanization" process—the process by which immigrants adapt
to their surroundings—and the importance of age-related factors in
determining transfer receipts, it is helpful to assess the experiences
of the whole immigrant population, including earlier arrivals, in
forming judgments as to the likely impact of newcomers. This is the
strategy pursued in this paper. In the conclusion we specifically
consider the implications of our findings for recent immigrants.
Immigrant-native differences in receipts from major transfer pro-
grams during 1975 are shown in Table 1. At a superficial level, these
figures lend some support to fears that immigrants constitute a burden
on the transfer payment system. On average male immigrants and their
families (immigrant families) received more of both welfare (e.g., pub-
lic assistance, AFDC, supplemental security income) and social insurance
(e.g., social security, unemployment insurance, workman's compensation)
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pajnnents than native-bom males and their families (native families)
.
This amounted to a total differential of 53 percent or $571 per family
per year. This differential reflects both immigrant families' greater
likelihood of participating in each type of program (i.e., welfare or
social insurance) and their higher average payment levels conditional
on participation.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a fuller understanding of
the reasons for these immigrant-native differences in the utilization
of transfers. Such an investigation may be useful in formulating immi-
gration policy. For example, if policy makers wish to minimize the size
of outlays on transfers, such information may be relevant to the selec-
tion of criteria for admitting immigrants and/or for determining the
level of immigration permitted. On the other hand, a deeper investiga-
tion of the causes of these observed differentials may suggest that im-
migrants do not, in fact, unduly burden the transfer payment system (in
conqjarison to the native bom) and that a reduction of transfer pajnnent
outlays on their account need not be a major policy concern.
Economic theory suggests that "...migration in response to economic
incentives is generally more profitable for the more able and more
3highly motivated" (Chiswick, 1978 p. 900). If such traits are distrib-
uted similarly across countries, immigrants may be more able or highly
motivated than native-bom individuals with similar characteristics.
This implication is weakened to the extent that migration is politically
motivated or is induced by the availability of more generous welfare
benefits in the place of destination (Chiswick 1978). Research on the
earnings of immigrants tends to support the self-selection hypothesis.
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Using 1970 Census data, Chiswick (1978) finds that while male immigrants
initially earn less than natives with similar characteristics, they tend
to catch up to and then surpass the native-born in earnings in a 10 to
15 year period. Similar findings are obtained by Blau (1980) for the
early twentieth century, a period when welfare availability would not
have been a consideration in the immigration decision.
These findings suggest interesting questions regarding the utili-
zation of transfers by immigrants. Does the increasing economic success
of immigrants over time imply a decreasing reliance on transfers? As a
more highly motivated group, are immigrants more reluctant to rely on
transfer payments, all else equal, particularly welfare payments which
have a negative social connotation? It is hoped that this paper may
shed further light on the notion of the selectivity of immigration and
its implications for social policy by examining the utilization of
transfers by immigrants.
To elucidate these issues, we seek to deteirmine whether immigrant
families place greater or lesser demands on the transfer system than na-
tive families with similar characteristics (i.e., whether immigrant fam-
ilies are more or less "transfer prone" than native families). We also
investigate the role of differences in characteristics across immigrant
and native families in producing a higher utilization of the transfer
system on the part of the former group. The policy implications of the
specific characteristics identified as of primary importance in produc-
ing the differential may then be evaluated. Of particular interest is
the role played by age and age-related variables.
The age distribution of the native population is determined primarily
4by domestic birth and death rates. However, in the case of immigrants.
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the major factor is the historical pattern of in-migration. Such in-
flows peaked during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(Blau, 1980). After World War I, restrictive legislation was adopted
that sharply curtailed the entry of iiranigrants» As a result, the
average age of immigrant male family heads, 51, is considerably higher
than that of native male heads, 45; and 30 percent of male immigrant
heads are 65 years of age or over, in comparison to 14 percent of the
male native heads (Table 2). Viewing the matter somewhat differently,
on average, there is one additional family member (excluding the male
head) 65 years of age or over for every five immigrant families in
comparison to one such older individual for every ten native families
(Table 2).
While immigrants have other characteristics that could raise their
reliance on transfers, ceteris paribus (e.g., a lower educational at-
tainment, a higher representation of minority groups), the role of age-
related factors has a particular policy relevance. To the extent that
the differences in the receipt of transfer payments shown in Table 1 are
due to the impact of age and age-related variables, a fairly good case
may be made for the view that the higher level of transfers among immi-
grants does not represent a cause for concern from a policy point of
view. First, as with any investment in human capital, immigration is
more profitable the earlier in the life cycle it takes place (i.e., the
longer the remaining work life period in which the returns may be col-
lected) . Thus, it is likely that the vast majority of older immigrants
have spent most of their working lives, including their most productive
years, in the United States. Second, to the extent that the collection
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of transfer pajments by older Individuals may be conceptualized as an
intergenerational transfer, older immigrants have their own working age
children who make positive contributions to this system in the form of
income and social security taxes, etc. Third, in the decision of which
and how many immigrants to admit, higher costs many years in the future
in the form of transfer payments to older individuals would have rela-
tively little weight in a present value calculation, at most discount
rates (Simon, 1980). Further, the age distribution of immigrants can
be manipulated by public policy in a beneficial manner, e.g., to even
out population imbalances in age composition due to past fluctuations
in domestic birth rates (Wachter, 1980).
II. Conceptual Framework
A. The Determinants of Transfers
Given that virtually all transfer programs have work disincentives
associated with them, the labor-leisure trade-off is at the heart of the
transfer decision. Individuals may be viewed as comparing the value of
market work with the benefits of participation in the transfer program.
Thus, the demand for transfers may be viewed as being determined by the
following factors. All else equal, the higher the individual's market
wage, the lower his demand for transfers is likely to be. Further, dif-
ficulty obtaining employment at the market wage corresponding to one's
characteristics, is expected to increase the demand for transfers, other
things equal. Factors which increase the demand for leisure at a given
price (e.g., higher nonlabor income or assets, certain demographic char-
acteristics) are expected to raise the demand for transfers, ceteris
paribus .
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The supply of transfers is determined by the eligibility require-
ments of the program; the program parameters (i.e., the guarantee level-
benefit level at zero work hours; the variables that determine the guar-
antee level; and the marginal tax rate on labor income); and the
stringency with which the program is administered. Given the individ-
ual's demand for and the potential supply of transfers, individual out-
comes may differ depending on the skillfulness of the individual in
understanding and navigating his way through the various bureaucratic
requirements (i.e., his "program skills").
As we have seen in Table 1, differences between two groups (e.g.,
immigrants and natives) in the average level of transfer receipts may
arise from group differences in the probability of participating in a
transfer program [P(T > 0)] or the level of payments received, given
participation [T|(T > 0)], or a combination of both. As part of our ef-
fort to explore a variety of potential sources of the observed differ-
ences between the two groups, we examine each separately. With respect
to determinants, the analysis is similar in each case, except that eli-
gibility would not influence the level of receipts of program partici-
pants [T| (T > 0)]. However, since the empirical analysis is conducted
on aggregates of programs, eligibility for additional programs within
categories could have an impact on the level of receipts, given partici-
pation.
In analyzing the utilization of transfers, it is helpful to distin-
guish between welfare (W) and social insurance (S) programs since the
two types of programs differ in eligibility requirements and the vari-
ables which determine guarantee levels (Lampman, 1976). While specific
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welfare programs are targeted on particular groups (e.g., disabled and
aged persons, broken families), the basic requirement for eligibility
is economic need as determined on the basis of current sources of income
and also of assets. Guarantee levels are designed to bring actual fam-
ily Income up to a stated level of need. Social insurance programs, on
the other hand may be viewed as being targeted on individuals who have
had a "firm attachment to the labor force" (Lampman, p. 163). Eligibil-
ity is determined by employment of a specified duration in a covered
sector. The determination of guarantee levels is guided primarily by
the replacement ratio principle where a specified portion of the income
lost (through disability, unemployment, retirement, etc.) is replaced
by the program. The level of the individual's nonwage income or assets
is typically not taken into account in determining pajnnents under social
insurance programs, however, other indicators of need, such as number
of dependents, do play a role in determining benefit levels in some so-
cial insurance programs. In light of these distinctions between the
two types of programs (W and S) , they will be analyzed separately in
the empirical work.
B. Immigrants and Transfer Payments
The analysis of the receipt of transfer payments by immigrants
raises some interesting and unique issues. First, is the complex role
played by the amount of time in the U.S. All else equal, the earnings
of immigrants have been found to be positively related to time spent in
the U.S. (Chiswick, 1978; Blau, 1980). While newcomers may initially
be at a disadvantage due to lack of knowledge of customs, job opportuni-
ties, etc., their earnings are expected to increase over time as they
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accumulate country-specific experience and seek out the best opportuni-
ties to utilize their skills and abilities. To the extent that higher
wages are associated with lower participation in transfer programs, the
indirect effect of time in the U.S. on the receipt of transfer payments
(through the wage) is likely to be negative. However, controlling for
the wage, the direct effect of time spent in the U.S. on transfers is
unclear, a priori . On the one hand, although we do not have evidence
on this point, it seems likely that the increased labor market informa-
tion accumxilated over time should reduce the incidence and/or duration
of unemplojment , ceteris paribus . This is expected to reduce the re-
ceipt of transfer payments with time spent in the country. On the other
hand, over time, individuals may accumulate more information about
transfer programs; their greater program skills may work to increase
their receipt of transfer payments, all else equal. Further, their eli-
gibility for and, in some cases, benefit levels in social insurance pro-
grams are expected to increase as immigrants accumulate emplojrment ex-
perience in covered sectors. The total effect of time spent in the U.S.
on the receipt of transfer payments is thus ambiguous a^ priori and de-
pends on the sign and level of the direct and indirect effects.
Second, like time in the U.S., the impact of English (speaking and
understanding) ability on transfer payment use is a consideration which
is primarily of relevance to the foreign bom (see Table 2), As in the
former case, the ability to speak and understand English well has an am-
biguous total effect on transfer payment use. All else equal, poor
English ability is expected to increase the utilization of transfer pro-
grams through its negative effect on wages. Controlling for wages, poor
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English ability may be hypothesized to increase the incidence and/or
duration of unemployment through its impact on access to labor market
information, resulting in a positive effect on transfer payment utiliza-
tion. However, the expected negative impact of poor English ability on
program skills and possibly employment in a covered sector may be ex-
pected to lower transfer payment use, ceteris paribus .
III. The Data
The data used in this study are from the 1976 Survey of Income and
Education (SIE). The SIE data were gathered nationally on 158,500 house-
holds, stratified so as to include more than proportional numbers of
households with children living in poverty. The immigrant sample is
comprised of all families in which the male head is a foreign-bom male,
18 years of age or over, who arrived in the U.S. during or before 1974,
The income data in the SIE refer to calendar year 1975. Those arriving
in 1976 were excluded from the analysis, since they did not earn income
or receive transfer payments in the U.S. during 1975. In addition,
since individuals who arrived during 1975 came after the start of the
year, their income and transfer data do not represent a full year, and
such individuals have therefore been excluded from the sample. To
economize on data processing costs, the native sample is comprised of a
random subsample of families from the SIE in which the male head is a
native-bom male, 18 years of age or over (native men married to im-
migrant women are not included in the native sample) . Individuals bom
in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories were excluded from the sample.
No information is available regarding the legal-illegal status of
the immigrants in the SIE sample. However, it seems likely that illegal
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innnigrants are underrepresented, since no special efforts were made to
include them. Other evidence suggests that the utilization of govem-
ment transfers by illegal immigrants is less than that of legal immi-
grants, since the former may be ineligible if their illegal status is
discovered (U.S. House of Representatives, 1978) „ Thus, a focus on le-
gal Immigrants is likely to give an upper bound on our estimates of the
utilization of transfers by immigrants.
IV. Empirical Procedures and Results
A. Estimation Procedures
The probability of participating in transfer programs [P(T > 0)]
and the level of receipts, given participation [t|(T > 0)] were esti-
mated separately for each type of transfer program (i.e., welfare and
social insurance programs). The variables included in the estimating
equations may be seen in Table 4 (see Table 3 for variable definitions).
The results presented here are for pooled immigrant-native regressions.
However, similar findings were obtained when separate regression equa-
tions were estimated for each group.
As noted earlier, all else equal, the wage is expected to nega-
tively affect P(T > 0) and t|(T > 0). However, in the empirical work,
we must qualify this prediction somewhat in the case of social insurance
programs where benefits are determined on the basis of the replacement
principle (i.e., are a positive function of earnings). Since we do not
explicitly control for the program parameters in the estimating equa-
tions, the sign of the wage variable becones uncertain a priori .
The income and asset variables (OTHERY and HOUSEQ) are proxies for
the demand for leisure as well as eligibility and benefit levels under
-11-
welfare programs. In the case of welfare programs, the latter consideration
is likely to outweigh the former and to result in a negative sign for
these variables. While positive signs on OTHERY and HOUSEQ are expected
in the social insurance equations (due to the effects of these variables
on the demand for leisure), we may note that their levels are measured
at the end of the year. Participants in social insurance programs may
have depleted their assets over the period, resulting in spurious negative
correlations between the utilization of social insurance transfers and
both variables. Further, high levels of income and assets may reflect
a taste for work and saving. Thus, due to greater past work experience,
persons with higher other income and assets may be more likely to qualify
for certain kinds of social insurance payments.
The racial and ethnic variables (BLACK, OTHER, SPAN) may reflect
the impact of labor market discrimination, controlling for wages and
other factors. If, for example, individuals from these groups expect
slower future wage growth as a result of labor market experience or en-
counter more difficulty locating a job (i.e., have higher unemployment
rates), they may be more likely to utilize transfers than comparable
white nonhispanics . There may be other racial and ethnic differences
in the demand for leisure, all else equal, due to noneconomic factors,
but one can only speculate on the signs of such possible effects.
The other demographic variables (MAR through HD68PLUS) are proxies
for the demand for leisure, as well as eligibility and benefit levels
under a variety of transfer programs. Given the various factors repre-
sented by these variables, it is not possible to predict all their signs
a_ priori . However, a positive association between the age of the head
and other family members and the collection of transfers is expected due
to both an increased demand for leisure and an increased eligibility for
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welfare (e.g., supplemental security) and social insurance (e.g., social
security retirement and disability) programs. VET is expected to posi-
tively affect the utilization of social insurance programs through its
impact on eligibility for veterans benefits. The locational variables
(SMSA through CENTER) are intended to control for area differences in
the eligibility requirements and benefit formulas of transfer programs,
as well as the stringency xd.th which the programs are administered at
the local level. The inclusion of these variables also adjusts for lo-
cational differences in economic conditions and the cost of living.
Finally, the variables ENGPOOR through (FOR) (BEFR20) are included
to capture the impact of foreign birth on the receipt of transfers. The
dumny variable specification of the impact of time spent in the U.S. was
dictated by the availability of this information only in categorical
form on the SIE tape. As noted earlier, the direct effects of these
variables on transfers, controlling for wages and other factors, are un-
clear, a^ priori . However, a positive association between the utiliza-
tion of social insurance transfers and time spent in the U.S. is likely
due to the accumulation of experience in covered sectors.
One problem in estimating these equations is that hourly wages can-
not be computed for those who were not employed at the time of the sur-
vey. It would be possible to use the estimated coefficients from an OLS
wage regression based on labor force participants to predict wages for
non-participants. However, a possible censoring bias arises from such
a procedure, if the probability of being employed is correlated with the
wage, given employment. This bias is potentially important in our sam-
ple since wages were not observed for 30 percent of the male heads. The
possible censoring bias in estimating wages can be eliminated using a
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technique developed by Heckman (1980) . For each individual i, one in-
cludes as an additional explanatory variable in a wage regression:
f(B'X.)
^i = F(B'X.)' ''^^^^
f(-) and F(-) are, respectively, the standard normal density and cumxila-
tive distribution functions, B is a vector of probit coefficients from
an equation estimating the probability of being employed at the time of
the survey and X includes all the exogenous explanatory variables pre-
sent in the wage and/or transfer equations.
The other explanatory variables in the wage equation include the
traditional human capital variables, marital status, race and ethnic
group, veteran status and the locational variables, as well as dummy
variables for English ability, foreign birth and time spent in the U.S.
(see Table A-1 for the exact specification of the wage equation)
.
It should also be noted that a possible censoring bias may ex-
ist in the case of the transfer receipt regression, as well, since it is
estimated on a censored sample of transfer program participants. However,
we have not attempted to correct for the problem in this case, since
the explanatory variables included in the transfer probability and re-
ceipt equations are identical. Although technically it would be possi-
ble to include an estimate of X based on that transfer probability equa-
tion in the transfer receipt equation (due to the nonlinear estimation
technique), the collinearity between \ and the other explanatory vari-
ables would be too severe to allow any meaningful conclusions. Censor-
ing bias is essentially an omitted variable problem. To the extent that
we have included proxies for the major determinants of the level of
transfer payments, it may not be important in this case. Further, even
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if censoring bias exists, some evidence suggest that its impact is con-
siderably larger when values of the dependent variable are inputed for
nonparticipants (Smith, 1980). Our use of the transfer receipt equation
is primarily limited to the participant group. Finally, there is no
reason to suppose that, to the extent censoring bias is present, immi-
grants and natives are differentially affected by it in such a way as
to bias our findings regarding group differences in transfer receipts
in one direction or another.
B, Empirical Results
Our findings for the estimation of the probability of participating
in welfare and social insurance programs [P(T > 0)] and the level of re-
ceipts from each type of program, given participation [t|(T > 0)] are
given in Table 4. We first briefly consider our findings for the con-
trol variables and then proceed to a detailed examination of the impact
of foreign-birth on the receipt of transfers.
Wages are found to have a significantly negative effect on the
probability of participating in both welfare and social insurance pro-
grams (despite the ambiguity of their expected effect in the latter
case). Specifically, computations based on the estimated coefficients
in Table 4 indicate that a 10 percent increase in wages is associated
with a 5.5 percent reduction in the probability of participating in wel-
fare programs and a 6 percent reduction in the probability of partici-
Q
pating in social insurance programs. Among participants in social in-
surance programs, the estimated wage coefficient is significantly
positively related to the level of receipts, possibly due to the impact
of the replacement ratio principle. Among participants in welfare pro-
grams, the coefficient on LNWAGE is positive but not significant. This
-15-
may indicate little labor supply response to wage changes among welfare
recipients or in part reflect the truncated nature of the sample.
The level of nonlabor income and assets is found to negatively in-
fluence the probability of participating in both types of transfer pro-
grams. It may be recalled that the negative effect of OTHERY and HOUSEQ
in the social insurance probit analyses may reflect asset depletion.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that, among participants,
OTHERY is significantly positively related to the level of social insur-
ance payments. (HOUSEQ is negative, but insignificant).
Other things equal, members of minority groups are more likely to
participate in welfare programs and less likely to participate in social
insurance programs, although these effects are not always statistically
significant. Among participants in transfer programs, there is some
tendency for members of minority groups to receive higher welfare pay-
ments, ceteris paribus . The coefficients on the racial and ethnic vari-
ables in the social insurance payment regression are not significant
and are generally small relative to their standard errors. As noted
earlier, the greater reliance of minority individuals on welfare may re-
flect the impact of labor market discrimination with respect to wage
growth and/or the probability of obtaining employment (as well as group
differences in the demand for leisure due to noneconomic factors). The
findings in Table 4 suggest that, all else equal, minority males (and/or
their spouses) have greater difficulty in qualifying for social insur-
ance programs, perhaps due in part to discrimination in gaining access
to covered employment. This would also work to increase their utiliza-
tion of welfare programs, ceteris paribus .
With respect to the impact of the demographic variables, it is par-
ticularly interesting, in light of the age composition differences between
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innnigrant and native households, to note the sizable effect of the age-
related variables on the probability of participating in both t3rpes of
transfer programs. Considering first the impact of the age of the male
head, we see, for example, that having a male head aged 65 to 67 or 68
and over substantially raises the probability of the family receiving
welfare payments (by 2.3 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively) rela-
9
tive to a family headed by a male aged 18 to 44, all else equal.
Similarly, in comparison to a family headed by a male aged 18 to 44,
the family's probability of participating in social insurance programs
is 49.3 percentage points higher when the male head is aged 65 to 67 and
67.3 percentage points higher when the head is 68 or over, ceteris paribus .
Among social insurance recipients, families headed by a male between the
ages of 65 and 67 receive $1706 more, and those headed by a male aged 68
or over receive $1978 more than families headed by an 18 to 44 year old
male, other things equal. All these effects are large relative to the
means of the dependent variables given in Table 1. (The effects of the
age of head variables on welfare receipts, given participation, are posi-
tive, but considerably smaller and are not statistically significant).
The presence of additional family members over 65 (excluding the
»male head) also has a strong positive effect on the collection of trans-
fers. An additional older person in the family raises the probability
of participation by 3.8 percentage points, in the case of welfare pro-
grams, and by 41.9 percentage points, in the case of social insurance
programs, ceteris paribus . All else equal, among participants in social
insurance programs, an additional older person raises payments received
by about $1092. (Again, the effect of an additional older person on
welfare payments received by participants is positive, but much smaller
and not statistically significant.)
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As expected, veterans are significantly more likely to participate
in social insurance programs which include veterans programs for which
only they are eligible. They also receive higher social insurance pay-
ments, all else equal, suggesting that veteran's progams are either more
generous than other social insurance programs or have a larger work dis-
incentive effect or both.
We now turn to a consideration of the impact of English (speaking
and understanding) ability and the dummy variables for time spent in the
U.S. on the utilization of transfers by immigrants. It may be recalled
that, all else equal, these variables influence the receipt of transfers
both indirectly, through their impact on wages, and directly, holding
wages constant. As expected, poor English ability was found to be sig-
nificantly negatively related to wages, while length of time in the U.S.
had a significant positive effect on wages, all else equal (see Table
A-1)
. This implies that the indirect effect of poor English ability
on the probability of participating in both types of transfer programs
is positive, while the indirect effect of time in the U.S. on transfer
program participation is negative. It may be recalled that the coeffi-
cient on wages in the receipt of transfer payments, given participation
regression was positive, although small and insignificant in the case of
welfare programs.
The estimated direct effects of English ability and time spent in
the U.S. on the probability of receiving transfers and on the level of
transfers, given participation, are given by the coefficients on these
variables in Table 4. Poor English ability of the head significantly
raises the probability of the family being on welfare by 1.2 percentage
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points, all else equal, possibly through its hypothesized positive iia-
pact on unemployment of the head. On the other hand, families headed
by a male who does not speak and understand English well have a signifi-
cantly lower probability (9.4 percentage points less) of collecting so-
cial insurance transfers, ceteris paribus
,
possibly due to the head's
difficulty in obtaining employment in the covered sector. Further,
among both types of transfer recipients, poor English ability of the
head is negatively associated with the level of receipts, although the
coefficients on ENGPOOR are not significant. This is consistent with
the notion that those with poor English ability have weaker program
skills which results in a lower level of receipts. In the case of so-
cial insurance programs this finding may also reflect a shorter duration
of covered employment among this group.
We now consider the direct impact of length of time in the U.S. of
the male head on the family's receipt of transfers (Table 4). With re-
spect to welfare programs, there is some tendency, albeit not a com-
pletely consistent or significant one, for earlier cohorts to be more
likely to participate than more recent arrivals, all else equal (includ-
ing wages)
. This may be due to the greater accumulation over time of
9
information about transfer programs discussed earlier. Among welfare
recipients, those who have been in the U.S. a longer period of time ap-
pear to have lower receipts, all else equal, although the effects are
not significant.
Length of time in the U.S. appears to have a stronger direct effect
on the collection of social insurance transfers. Controlling for the
wage and other factors, the length of time in the U.S. dummy variables
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are significantly positively related to the probability of participating
in social insurance programs. The magnitude of the coefficients tends
to rise mono tonically from the more recent entrants to the earlier ar-
rivals (until the group that arrived before 1920). Other things equal,
families headed by a male who arrived in the U.S. before 1960 are esti-
mated to have a 15.4 to 20.5 percentage point higher incidence of par-
ticipation in social insurance programs than those headed by more recent
(1970-74) arrivals. The coefficients on the year dummies in the social
insurance payment regression are also positive, significantly so among
those arriving between 1920 and 1949. Taken as a whole, these findings
suggest increased utilization of social insurance transfers by immi-
grants over time, ceteris paribus , as they gain access to and accumulate
experience in covered sectors (with a corresponding increase in eligi-
bility and, in some cases, benefit levels).
The total effects of these explanatory variables on the utilization
of transfers have been estimated on the basis of reduced form equations
(Table 5). Taking into account both direct and indirect effects,
those who do not speak and understand English well are more likely (than
those who do) to receive welfare payments, but less likely to partici-
pate in social insurance progrsuns. Those with poor English ability re-
ceive a lower level of each type of payment, given that they participate
in a transfer program. On net, those who do not speak and understand
English well have higher expected payments from welfare programs but
lower expected payments from social insurance programs. Their total ex-
pected payments are $202 lower than those whose command of Engish is su-
perior. This somewhat surprising result is dictated by their lower uti-
lization of social insurance programs.
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The cohort effects in Table 5 have been expressed relative to the
native-born to give an indication of the relative utilization of trans-
fers of immigrants in comparison to this group, ceteris paribus . Other
things equal, immigrant families are estimated to have a lower incidence
of welfare dependency and lower welfare receipts, given participation,
than native families, regardless of length of time in the U.S. of the
male head. As a result, the expected welfare receipts of immigrant fam-
ilies range from $17 to $34 less, ceteris paribus
, depending on length
of residence. On the other hand, while participation in social insur-
ance is initially less for immigrant than native families, after about
15 years of residence of the male head, immigrant families begin to have
a higher incidence of participation, all else equal. The social insur-
ance receipts of immigrant families given participation, are about the
same or less than native families, all else equal, when the male head
has arrived after 1949. However, among the families of longer-term res-
idents, receipts are higher than for native families, ceteris paribus .
To obtain an estimate of the relative importance of differences in
the response to given characteristics and differences in characteristics
in generating a higher utilization of transfers by immigrant families,
we turn to the decomposition in Table 6. We first consider immigrant-
native differences in the response to a given set of characteristics
—
or the overall effect of foreign-birth, all else equal, when the length
of time in the U.S. variables are evaluated at their mean levels for im-
migrants (row 7) . Again, reduced form transfer equations (omitting wages
as an explanatory variable) are employed to obtain total effects. But
it is interesting to note that the wages of immigrant male heads are
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found to be about 14 percent higher than those of comparable native's
(column 1, row 7). This finding is supportive of the notion of the
selectivity of inmigration in terms of ability and/or motivation of
which Chiswick (1978) and Blau (1980) have found evidence. Higher immigrant
wages, all else equal, work to lower the probability of participating in
welfare and social insurance programs of immigrants in comparison to
natives, while raising the level of receipts in these programs, given
participation.
Turning to transfers, we see that in fact immigrant families have
a lower utilization of welfare than natives with similar characteristics.
Their probability of participating in welfare programs is 1,2 percentage
points lower than similar native families (column 2, row 7). This is
52 percent less than the predicted welfare probability for a native fam-
ily with native mean characteristics (2.3 percent). Similarly, their
level of welfare payments, given participation, is estimated to be 12
percent ($174) lower than the predicted level for a native family with
mean native characteristics ($1472) . This resvilts in an expected wel-
fare payment among immigrant families that is estimated to be 37 percent
($19) lower than the predicted level for a native family with mean na-
tive characteristics ($34), On the other hand, immigrant families are
as likely to participate in social insurance programs as comparable na-
tive families (column 3, row 7). But their receipt of social insurance
payments, given participation, is 4 percent ($98) higher than a native
family with native mean characteristics ($2611) , Thus, the expected social
insurance payment of an immigrant family is estimated to be 4 percent ($37)
higher than the predicted value for a typical native family ($998),
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On net, all else equal, the total expected transfer payment of an
innnigrant family is only 2 percent ($18) higher than the predicted level
for a native family with mean native characteristics. This reflects a
considerably lower (in relative terms) utilization of welfare and a
slightly higher (in relative terms) utilization of social insurance by
immigrant families than by native families, ceteris paribus . The higher
utilization of social insurance programs by immigrant families, ceteris
paribus
,
was solely due to their higher level of receipts, given partic-
ipation. This, in turn, is partly a reflection of their greater labor
market success (higher wages), all else equal, since wages are posi-
tively related to the level of social insurance receipts, given partic-
ipation, due to the replacement ratio principle. These findings are con-
sistent with the notion that immigrants are a more highly motivated or
able group than the native bom. But it is interesting to see that the
impact of economic success is not unambiguously to lower transfers.
Overall, differences in immigrant-native responses to the same set
of variables do not account for a substantial portion of the observed
differences in transfer receipts between the two groups. Thus, virtually
the entire difference must be due to differences in characteristics. As
noted earlier, a variety of characteristics may contribute to the observed
differences. Table 6 suggests that, as expected, age and age-related
variables play a major role. Age-related factors account for 44 percent
of the predicted immigrant-native differential in expected welfare receipts
($7.42/$16.84) ; 96 percent of the predicted differential in expected so-
cial insurance receipts ($750.43/$778.72) ; and 95 percent of the pre-
dicted differential in total expected transfer receipts ($757.85/
$795.56). As noted earlier, to the extent that the higher utilization
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of transfers by inmigrants is due to age-related factors, it may not
constitute a cause for concern from a policy point of view.
Immigrants ' lower levels of education and greater concentration in
SMSA's and in the Northeast tend to raise their expected receipts from
both welfare and social insurance programs. The higher representation
of minority groups among immigrants increases their expected welfare
payments but lowers their expected social insurance payments, resulting
in lower total transfer receipts. On net, the other personal character-
istics of immigrants work to lower their total transfer receipts, with
a major factor being the lower proportion of veterans among immigrant
male heads (which lowers their utilization of social insurance trans-
fers). The higher representation of individuals who have poor English
ability reduces their total transfer receipts on balance. This reflects
their lower probability of participating in social insurance programs,
as well as their lower receipts, given participation, in both types of
programs.
V. Conclusion
Considerable social concern has been expressed over the possibility
that immigrants may constitute a burden on the U.S. transfer payment
system. The total expected transfer payment to an immigrant family is
indeed found to be $571 higher on average than for a native family.
However, when these differences are considered more closely, consider-
able doubt is cast on the validity of the above concern.
We have found that immigrant families are, in fact, considerably
less likely to rely on welfare than native families with similar charac-
teristics. As a result, their expected receipts from such programs are
57 percent lower than those of comparable native families. Immigrant
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families are about as likely to participate in social insurance programs
as native families with the same characteristics, but their receipt of
payments from such programs, given participation, is somewhat higher.
As a result, the expected social insurance payment of an immigrant fam-
ily is found to be slightly (4 percent) higher than a comparable native
family. Overall, we estimate that, on average, the total expected
transfer payment to immigrant families is only 2 percent higher than
their native counterparts. Thus, behavioral differences in the response
of immigrant and native families to the same characteristics account
for a negligible portion of the observed higher receipts of transfer
payments by immigrant families. This implies that the observed differ-
ence between the two groups is almost entirely due to group differences
in characteristics.
With respect to specific characteristics, we have found that
immigrant-native differences in age-related variables are the primary
cause of the higher utilization of transfers by immigrant families, ac-
counting for 95 percent of the total immigrant-native difference. Since
the age distribution of immigrants is determined by historical trends
in immigration (particularly the adoption of a more restrictive immigra-
tion law after World War I) rather than by domestic birth and death
rates, immigrants tend to be older, on average, than native-born indi-
viduals. This factor tends to increase their utilization of transfers,
all else equal. However, since it is likely that the vast majority of
older immigrants have spent most of their working lives in the U.S. and
have working age children who contribute to tax revenues, a higher uti-
lization of transfers of immigrants due to age-related factors does not
appear to unduly burden the transfer payment system.
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In considering the policy implications of these findings, it is im-
portant to point out that they are in part dependent on the past compo-
sition of the immigrant group. If, in the future, we were to see, for
example, a widening of the immigrant-native disparity in educational
attainment or an increase in the proportion of refugees among immigrants,
the relative utilization of transfers by immigrants might begin to pose
a social problem. However, for the most part, these findings suggest
grounds for cautious optimism. For example, one issue regarding recent
immigrants is the high representation of minority group individuals
among them. But, as we have seen, the higher representation of minority
groups among immigrants in the past has actually worked to lower their
total transfer receipts, on net: increasing their expected welfare pay-
ments but lowering their expected social insurance pajnnents. Similarly,
the higher representation among immigrants of individuals who have poor
English ability has also reduced their total transfer receipts, on
balance due to their lower probability of participating in social in-
surance programs, as well as their lower receipts, given participation,
in both types of programs. Finally, it is possible that the immigra-
tion decisions of the post-1949 cohorts of immigrants were influenced
to a greater extent than earlier cohorts by the availability of more
generous transfers in the U.S. than in other countries. However, when
the analysis was replicated including only immigrants who had arrived
after 1949, essentially the same results were obtained.
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Footnotes
For an attempt to balance out the costs and benefits of Immigra-
tion at an aggregate level, see Simon (1980). For a study dealing with
illegal immigrants, see North and Houston (1976). The U.S. House of
Representatives, Report of the Special Committee on Population (1978)
states:
"Tmmi grants undoubtedly have an effect on the cost of provid-
ing a whole range of public services including welfare, medical
care, education, public housing, fire and police protection, sani-
tation, transportation, and recreation. Few of these effects, how-
ever, have received more than cursory attention by immigration re-
searchers or by the administrators of these public services."
2
The nature and significance of the distinction between welfare
and social insurance type programs is explained in detail below.
3
Greater ability or motivation raises both the opportunity cost of
migrating (foregone earnings in the place of origin) and the return to
migration (expected earnings tn the place of destination). However, the
direct costs of migrating wotild be the same for all individuals regard-
less of ability or motivation. Thus greater ability or motivation is
expected to raise the returns to migration more than the costs.
4Outmigration is a relatively minor factor in the case of the
United States.
Using 1970 census data, Chiswick (1977) has found that, other
things equal, the native-born sons of immigrants have higher earnings
than the native-bom sons of native-born parents. For a similar finding
using data from the early 1900 's, see Blau (1980).
See, for example, Lyon (1977), Abrahamse, et al. (1976), Hamermesh
(1979), Parsons (1980).
In 1973, the unenployment rate of males 20 years of age and over
was 11.7 percent among Blacks and other nonwhites, 9.7 among those of
Spanish origin, but only 6.2 percent among whites (Employment and Train-
ing Report of the President , 1976, p. 223).
Q
The computation of these wage effects is illustrated in the case
of social insurance programs (S) where the percentage change in the par-
ticipation probability for a 10 percent increase in wages is given by:
In 1.1 • B^g f(B^X)/ SOC , where
By„ is the estimated probit wage coefficient for participating in social
insurance programs; Bg is the estimated vector of probit coefficients
for participating in social insurance programs; f (-) is the density
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function for a standard normal random variable; SOC is a dummy variable
equaling 1 if the individual particpates in social insurance programs,
and otherwise (i.e., the dependent variable in the social insurance
probit analysis); and a line over the expression indicates that the
weighted sample mean value is employed.
9
These partial derivatives are computed analogously to the wage
effects explained above (footnote 8), i.e., in the case_of social insur-
ance programs, for an exogenous variable (X, ) ; B, f(B'X).
As may be seen in Table A-1, the coefficient on X is signifi-
cantly negative. The use of coefficients from wage regressions includ-
ing A to estimate predicted wages for the full sample .(including nonla-
bor force participants) resulted in lower mean estimates than the use
of coefficients from wage regressions that did not include an adjustment
for selectivity bias. This suggests that employed individuals have unob-
servables that are positively related to wages.
"''"See Table A-2.
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TABLE 1
RECEIPT OF TRANSFER PAYMENTS BY IMMIGRANT
AND NATIVE FAMILIES, 1975*'
Natives Iimnl grants
Welfare [W] $ 71.59 $ 98.09
Social Insurance [S] $ 997.35 $1541.64
Total [W + S] $1068.94 $1639.73
Participation in Welfare [P(W > 0)] .045 .057
Participation in Social Insurance
[P(S > 0)] .369 .464
Welfare, Given Participation
[W|(W>0)3 $1584.53 $1708.3^
Social Insurance, Given Participation
[S|(S > 0)] $2700.70 $3324.40
Number of observations 7205 5730
welfare payments include income received by the family from public as-
sistance, welfare (including Aid to Families with Dependent Children)
or supplemental security income. Social insurance payments include
income received by the family from social security, railroad retire-
ment, veterans payments, unemployment compensation or workman's compen-
sation.
b
Observations are weighted by sampling weights reported in the SIE.
Source: Survey of Income and Education, 1976.
TABLE 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONSa,b
Variable
Natives
Mean S.D. Mean
Immigrants
S.D.
EDUC
EXP
EXP''
BLACK
OTHER
SPAN
MAR
VET
OTHERY
HOUSEQ
SPEDUC
PER18T64
PERGE65
KIDSLT18
HD45T59
HD60T64
HD65T67
HD68PLUS
ENGPOOR
ENTRY COHORT
1965-69
1960-65
1950-59
1920-49
BEFR20
SMSA
SOUTH
WEST
CENTER
predicted
lnwage'^
12.045
27.799
1086.674
.087
.006
.019
.851
.480
863.433
15646.647
10.265
1.021
.096
.945
.274
.071
.040
.097
.001
.908
.331
.180
.281
1.474
3.324
17.717
1161.369
.282
.076
.136
.356
.500
3204.229
18720.127
4.893
.748
.304
1.326
.446
.258
.196
.296
.032
*
.289
.470
.384
.450
.349
10.783
35.676
1691.963
.035
.095
.231
.825
.184
1162.990
15359.953
8.843
.923
.209
.825
.221
.067
.048
.256
.114
.132
.105
.195
.358
.070
.967
.178
.272
.168
1.379
4.695
20.474
1604.384
.185
.293
.421
.380
.387
3903.915
19561.713
5.442
.823
.419
1.281
.415
.250
.213
.436
.317
.339
.306
.396
.480
.256
.180
.382
.445
.373
.458
a.
See Table 3 for variable definitions.
Observations are weighted by sampling weights reported in the SIE.
'Predicted on the basis of the wage regression with selectivity bias
correction presented in Table A-1.
*Not applicable.
TABLE 3
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
EDUC Highest grade completed.
EXP Potential experience = age - education - 5 (constrained to be
greater than or equal to 0).
EXP2 Potential experience squared.
BLAOC Equals 1 if the male head is black, and otherwise.
OTHER Equals 1 if the male head is other nonwhite, and otherwise.
SPAN Equals 1 if the male head is of Spanish origin, and other-
wise.
MAR Equals 1 if the male head is married, spouse present, and
otherwise.
VET Equals 1 if the male head is a veteran, and otherwise,
OTHERY Amount of the family's nonlabor, nontransfer income.
HOUSEQ Market value of the house minus value of the mortgage out-
standing.
SPEDUC Equals highest grade completed of spouse, if married, and
otherwise.
PER18T64 Number of family members, excluding male head, aged 18-64.
PERGE65 Number of family members, excluding male head, aged 65 and over.
KIDSLT18 Nvimber of children less than 18 years of age.
HD45T59 Equals 1 if the male head is aged 45-59, and otherwise.
HD60T64 Equals 1 if the male head is aged 60-64, and otherwise.
HD65T67 Equals 1 if the male head is aged 65-67, and otherwise.
HD68PLUS Equals 1 if the male head is aged 68 or more, and otherwise.
ENGPOOR Equals 1 if the male head does not speak or understand English
well, and otherwise.
FOR Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born, and otherwise.
(FOR) (EDUC) Equals highest grade completed by the male head if foreign-
born, and otherwise.
TABLE 3 (cont.)
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
(FOR) (1970-74) Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born and entered
the U.S. between 1970 and 1974, and otherwise (refer-
ence category in the regressions).
(FOR) (1965-69) Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born and entered
the U.S. between 1965 and 1969, and otherwise.
(FOR) (1960-64) Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born and entered
the U.S. between 1960 and 1964, and otherwise.
(FOR) (1950-59) Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born and entered
the U.S. between 1950 and 1959, and otherwise.
(FOR) (1920-49) Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born and entered
the U.S. between 1920 and 1949, and otherwise.
(FOR)(BEFR20) Equals 1 if the male head is foreign born and entered
the U.S. before 1920, and otherwise.
LNWAGE Natural log of the hourly wage.
WELFARE Amount of income received by the family from public assis-
(W) tance, welfare (including Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) or supplemental security income.
SOCIAL Amount of income received by the family from social security,
INSURANCE railroad retirement, veterans payments, unemployment compen-
(S) sation or workman's compensation.
SMSA Equals 1 if the family resides in an SMSA, and otherwise.
SOUTH Equals 1 if the family resides in the South, and otherwise.
WEST Equals 1 if the family resides in the West, and otherwise.
CENTER Equals 1 if the family resides in the North Central U.S.,
and otherwise.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS
Variables
Participation
Probability (Probit)'
Level of Receipts
Among Participants (OLS)
Welfare
Social Social
Insurance Welfare Insurance
-.104x10"^**
(.435x10'"^)
-.437x10"^***
(.812x10"^)
-.008 .022***
(.043) (.007)
-.008 -.001
(.005) (.001)
-.036 338.23** 77.39
(.062) (168.26) (126.48)
-.165*** 254.63 -142.66
(.063) (205.57) (124.61)
-.109** 437.19** 121.18
(.055) (182.44) (108.75)
.432*** 145.38 393.40***
(.079) (237.91) (121.14)
-.035***
-16.86 -7.14
(.006) (20.61) (9.32)
.187*** 148.38** 124.34***
(.021) (69.35) (37.36)
1.054*** U8.22 1092.40***
(.060) (136.84) (67.89)
-.036*** 97.97** 67.49**
(.011) (37.97) (26.63)
-.034 274.73* 325.28***
(.036) (151.54) (81.86)
.327*** 254.91 791.76***
(.053) (261.65) (107.14)
1.240*** 79.15 1705.50***
(.075) (266.60) (109.21)
1.691*** 200.39 1978.10***
(.076) (234.06) (102.02)
.417*** -68.71 140.24**
(.031) (136.14) (56.78)
-.237***
-115.46 -124.45
(.078) (201.95) (135.35)
-.289*** -109.16 -157.59
(.070) (253.48) (174.18)
.283*** 80.63 129.64
(.081) (302.19) (203.89)
.334*** 105.74 138.84
(.088) (323.62) (215.94)
.403*** -60.41 118.65
(.077) (304.10) (187.92)
OTHERY
HOUSEQ
BLACK
OTHER
SPAN
MAR
SPEDUC
PER18T64
PERGE65
KIDSLT18
HD45T59
HD60T64
HD65T67
HD68PLUS
VET
ENGPOOR
FOR
(FOR) (1965-69)
(FOR) (1960-64)
(FOR) (1950-59)
-.412x10"J**
(.163x10':)
-.186x10"^***
(.185x10"^)
.494***
(.078)
.268***
(.089)
.286***
(.077)
-.106
(.104)
-.032***
(.008)
.293***
(.030)
.637***
(.065)
.136***
(.017)
.168***
(.062)
.079
(.103)
.392***
(.111)
.223**
(.100)
-.021
(.053)
.195**
(.094)
-.425***
(.108)
.083
(.126)
.250*
(.136)
.191
(.125)
TABLE 4 (cont.)
REGRESSION RESULTS
Variables
Participation
Probability (Probit)'
Level of Receipts
Among Participants (OLS)'
Social Social
Welfare Insurance Welfare Insurance
(FOR) (1920-49) .218* .515*** -295.75 294.61*
(oll7) (.077) (274.83) (177.46)
(FOR) (BEFR20) .074 .388** -98.17 152.82
(.149) (.162) (341,43) (196.34)
PPFniCTED LNWAGE -.491*** -.660*** 21.77 249.93***
(.082) (.069) (180.90) (83.55)
SMSA .152 .020 202.40 34.36
(.104) (.061) (255.77) (107.29)
SOUTH -.068 -.279*** -550.41*** -132.45*
(.067) (.041) (163.40) (77.23)
WEST .019 -.177*** -297,58** -137.71**
(.060) (.036) (151.56) (65.28)
CENTER -.148** -.176*** -374.48** -44.31
(.066) (.038) (169.98) (66.61)
CONSTANT -1.167*** .226** 1135.00*** 773.78***
(.157) (.112) (374,93) (167.08)
-2xL0G LIKELI-
HOOD RATIO
ADJUSTED R
837.260 5517.138
,051 .293
N OF OBSER-
VATIONS 12935 12935 595 5460
(a) Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
(b) Standard errors in parenthesis
*Significant at the 10% level on a two-tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level on a two-tailed test
***Signif icant at the 1% level on a two-tailed test
TABLE 5
TOTAL EFFECTS OF FOREIGN BIRTH, LENGTH OF TIME IN THE U.S. AND ENGLISH
ABILITY ON THE RECEIPT OF TRANSFER PAYMENTS^
Participation Receipts, Given Expected Transfer
Variable Probability Participation*^ Receipt"
Social Social Social
Welfare Insurance Welfare Insurance Welfare Insurance Total
Foreign^ and
Arrived:
1970-74 -.024 -.120 -163.07 -162.68 -33.53 -353.48 -387.01
1965-69 -.022 -.039 -95.49 -1.27 -28.96 -90.19 -119.15
1960-64 -.012 -.022 -66.49 14.86 -16.84 -44.74 -61.58
1930-59 -.015 .016 -230.89 -12.24 -23.49 31.14 7.65
1920-49 -.010 .056 -553.10 177.38 -25.45 2U.01 185.56
Before 1920 -.011 .051 -415.65 109.70 -23.32 168.66 145.34
ENGPOOR .019 -.066 -227.22 -143.28 17.55 -219.90 -202.36
Computed on the basis of reduced form equations, see Table A-2.
The partial derivative of the probability of participating in a transfer program
(PT) with respect to an exogenous variable (X. ) is computed as:
where 6 is the estimated probit coefficient on X, and f (3'X) is the value of the
normal density function evaluated at the weighted sample means of the exogenous variables.
The partial derivative of the level of receipts, given participation (T) with
respect to an exogenous variable (X, ) is the estimated OLS regression coefficient.
The expected transfer receipt (ET) is defined as:
ET = PT X T
where PT and T have been defined above. The partial derivative of the expected transfer
receipt with respect to an exogenous variable (X. ) is computed as:
9ET _ 3PT 9T
3Xj^ ~ X 3X^ X 3Xj^
where T— and PT— are evaluted at the weighted sample means of the exogenous variables,
%ote that all length of time in the U.S. effects are expressed relative to native-
born individuals. The (FOR) (EDUC) interaction term is evaluated at the weighted sample
mean level of EDUC.
DECOMPOSITION OF THE IMMIGRANT-NATIVE
WAGE AND TRANSFER DIFFERENTIALS^
Characteristic Wage
(1)
Participation
Probability^
Receipts,
Given ,
Participation
Expected Trans
Receipts
fer
Welfare
(2)
Social
Insurance
(3)
Welfare
(4)
Social
Insurance
(5)
Welfare
(6)
Social
Insurance Total
(7) (8)
Race or Ethnic Group -.0281 .0034 -.0076 133.53 1.78 8.51 -19.16 -10.65
Age-related Factors -.0960 .0040 .1657 57.06 580.02 7.42 750.43 757.85
Education^ -.0732 .0066 ,0308 -21.93 -10.70 9.07 76.03 85.10
Other Personal ,
Characteristics -.0254 .0028 -.0301 0.71 -35.40 4.14 -91.06 -86.92
Location .0105 .0022 .0153 85 . 20 25.60 5.37 50.14 55.51
Poor English Ability -.0127 .0022 -.0076 -65.32 -13.74 1.61 -24.97 -23.36
Foreign-birth-" - .1306 -.0118 .0 -173.98 97.59 -19.28 37.31 18.03
Total Predicted
Differential*^ -.0943 .0094 .1665 15.27 645.15 16.84 778.72 795.56
insfer decompositions based on reduced form equations, see Table A-2.
the case of the OLS regressions, e.g. for the level of receipts, given participation (T) , the
ierential associated with the 1. . .m variables included in characteristic C (DC_) is computed
m m
I
DC„ = Z B.CX.^. - X,.-) = E B.X._ + Z B.X,., - Z B.X,.,
T . , 1 il IN . T i il . . 1 i iN , , i iN1=1 1=1 i=m+l i=l
m
= Z B.X.^ - ( E B.X.-- + E B.X.t)
. T 1 il . T i iN . _.T i ili=l i=l i=m+l
:e B. is the estimated regression coefficient on X,; X
,
^ and X. are the weighted means of X.
immigrants and natives respectively; and there are n variables. Note that the weighted means
computed for the relevant subgroup, i.e., welfare or social insurance program participants.
1 the case of the probit analyses of transfer participation probabilities (PT), the differential
liciated with the l...m variables included in characteristic C (DCp„) is computed as:
DCp^ = F( E B^.j + /_/?iN^ - ^V/^iN^i=l i=i!rH i=l
I
re B is the estimated probit coefficient on X ; F( - ) is the cumulative distribution function
a standard normal variable; and the other symbols have been defined above. Note that in the
rical work DCp_ as con5>uted above was found to be approximately equal to
Continue TABLE 6
m n
[F(_ZB.X.^) -F(ZB.X.^+
.' /Al^^-
x=l i=l i=m+-l
In the case of the expected transfer payment (ET) the differential associated with the l...m
variables included in characteristic C (DC_„) is computed as
:
1=1 i=m+l 1=1 i=nt+-l 1=1 i=l
?here the symbols have been defined above.
'Includes BLACK, OTHER, SPAN.
"Includes EXP, EXP2, PER18T64, PERGE65, KIDSLT18, HD45T59, HD60T64, HD65T67, HD68PLUS.
'Includes EDUC.
^Includes OTHERY, HOUSEQ, MAR, SPEDUC, VET.
"Includes SMSA, SOUTH, WEST, CENTER.
Includes FOR, (FOR) (EDUC), (FOR) (1965-69), (FOR) (1960-64)
,
(FOR) (1950-59)
,
:fOR) (1920-49), (FOR) (BEFR20)
.
'Sum of rows (1) through (7).
TABLE A-1
WAGE REGRESESSIONS
(STANDARD ERRORS)
Without Selectivity With Selectivity-
Variables Bias Correction Bias Correction
EDUC .058*** .058***
(.003) (.003)
EXP o035*** .038***
2
EXP
(.002)
-.552x10"^***
(.293x10 )
(.002) -
-.658x10"^***
(.479x10"^)
BLACK -.101*** -.104***
(.032) (.032)
OTHER -.007 -.013
(.031) (.031)
SPAN -.159*** -.153***
(.027) (.027)
MAR .126*** .130***
(.019) (.020)
VET .059*** .074***
(.016) (.016)
ENGPOOR -.124*** -.113***
(.041) (.042)
FOR .175*** .196***
(.061) (.061)
(FOR) (EDUC) -.016*** -.018***
(.004) (.004)
(FOR) (1965-69) .109*** .117***
(.038) (.038)
(FOR) (1960-64) .151*** ,143***
(.042) (.042)
(FOR) (1950-59) .105*** .108***
(.036) (.036)
(FOR) (1920-49) .144*** .136***
(.038) (.038)
(FOR)(BEFR20) .398*** .334***
(.117) (.120)
SMSA .085*** .091***
(.031) (.031)
SOUTH -.040* -.046**
(.021) (.021)
WEST -.041** -.049***
(.018) (.019)
CENTER -.021 -.023
(.019) (.019)
TABLE A-1 (cont.)
Variables
Without Selectivity
Bias Correction
With Selecti-vity
Bias CorrectidTt"
CONSTANT
ADJUSTED R
.317***
C.060)
.139
-.191***
G068I
.237***
C.066)
,139
Number of
Observations 9116 9116
*Signi£icant at the 10% level on a two-tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level on a two-tailed test
***Significant at the 1% level on a two-tailed test
TABLE A-2
REDUCED FORM REGRESSIONS
Participation
^
Level of Receipts Among
Lpants (OLS)Probability (Probit)° Partic:
Variables Welfare Social Insurance Welfare Social Insurance
EDUC -.087*** -.062*** 27.89 6.44
(.012) (.007) (26.81) (13.48)
EXP -.009 -.013*** 32.93** 10.83
(.006) (.004) (15.73) (8.40)
EXP^ .101x10^?
.804x10"^
.137x10^?*
(.747x10"^)'
-.209 -.192**
(.185) (.092)
BLACK .494*** .015 329.67** 43.29
(.079) (.062) (167.57) (126.44)
OTHER .240*** -.149** 308.48 -148.66
(.089) (.063) (206.21) (124.71)
SPAN .310*** -.030 453.22** 80.60
(.076) (.054) (180.09) (108.35)
MAR -.262** .238*** 96.39 414.01***
(.112) (.085) (248.52) (129.29)
VET -.045 .361*** -78.86 160.81***
(.052) (.030) (136.06) (56.24)
OTHERY -.372x10^**
(.160x10 )
-.100xlO"t**
(.436x10"^)
-.011 -.022***
(.043) (.007)
HOUSEQ -.183x10"^***
(.186x10"^)
-.445x10"^***
(.822x10"^)
-.008*
(.005)
-.001
(.001)
SPEDUC -.025*** -.027*** -7.88 -6.18
(.009) (.006) (21.39) (9.83)
PER18T64 .291*** .185*** 136.15** 123.94***
(.030) (.021) (69.42) (37.40)
PERGE65 .636*** 1.062*** 119.71 1093.30***
(.066) (.060) (137.59) (68.30)
KIDSLT18 .125*** -.047*** 78.27** 65.40**
(.018) (.012) (38.78) (27.52)
TABLE A-2 (cont'd).
REDUCED FORM REGRESSIONS
Participation
Probability (Probit)^
Level of Receipts Among
Participants (OLS)
Variables Welfare Social Insurance Welfare Social Insurance
HD45T59 .108
(.102)
-.014
(.061)
-144.56
(247,24)
316.31**
(140.80)
HD60T64 .084
(.161)
.448***
(.097)
-359.92
(391.97)
716.90***
(194.22)
HD65T67 .426**
(.179)
1„423***
(ol22)
-563.66
(421.64)
1707.2***
(208.22)
HD68PLUS .379*
(.199)
2.014***
(.150)
-503.54
(463.96)
1993.80***
(230.03)
ENGPOOR .327***
(.097)
-.167**
(.080)
-227.22
(211.32)
-143.28
(136.99)
FOR -1.128***
(.175)
-.503***
(.119)
251.47
(388.02)
-192.55
(237.84)
(FOR) (EDUC) .063***
(.012)
.018**
(.008)
-36.35
(29,53)
2.62
(13.91)
(FOR) (1965-69) .041
(.125)
.205**
(.081)
67.58
(301.13)
161.41
(203.91)
(FOR) (1960-64) .201
(.135)
.246***
(.088)
96.58
(322.74)
177,54
(215.82)
(FOR) (1950-59) .165
(.125)
.343***
(.077)
-67.82
(304.02)
150.44
(188.06)
(FOR) (1920-49) .251**
(.119)
.443***
(.078)
-390.03
(283.51)
340.06*
(179.02)
(FOR) (BEFRZO) .233
(.166)
.431**
(.178)
-252.58
(378.47)
272.38
(209.75)
SMSA .109
(.104)
-.036
(.060)
205.61
(254.24)
59.65
(106.86)
SOUTH -.059
(.067)
-.241***
(.041)
-546.05***
(163.16)
-145,51*
(77.46)
Variables
TABLE A-2 (cont'd.)
REDUCED FORM REGRESSIONS
Wei fare
Participation
Probability (Probit)'
Social Insurance
Level of Receipts Among
Participants (OLS)
Wei fare Social Insurance
WEST
CENTER
CONSTANT
-2XL0GLIKE-
LIHOOD
RATIO
ADJUSTED R
.063
(.060)
-.135**
(.066)
-.657***
(.212)
874.790
-.135***
(.036)
-.158***
(.038)
.299**
(.128)
5541.827
-325.23**
(151.38)
-404.70**
(170.00)
436,66
(502.52)
-147.98**
(65,34)
-50.32
(66.71)
921.50***
(248.95)
.056 .293
N OF OB-
SERVATIONS 12935 12935 595 5460
(a) Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
(b) Standard errors in parenthesis
*Significant at the 10% level on a two-tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level on a two-tailed test
***Significant at the 1% level on a two-tailed test
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